Michigan Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 4

1949

INTERNATIONAL LAW-SEIZURE OF FOREIGN VESSELS ON THE
HIGH SEAS
David D. Ring S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law of the Sea Commons, and
the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
David D. Ring S.Ed., INTERNATIONAL LAW-SEIZURE OF FOREIGN VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS, 47 MICH.
L. REV. 555 (1949).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/6

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1949]

CoMMENTS

555

INTERNATIONAL LAW-SEIZURE OF FOREIGN VESSELS ON THE HIGH

SEAS-After World War I, the Allied Powers under Article XXII of
the Covenant of the League of Nations designated Great Britain mandatary of Palestine, providing inter alia that, as far as possible without
prejudice to the rights of the then residents of Palestine, steps were to
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be taken to facilitate Jewish immigration. A High Commissioner for
Palestine was appointed, who, by the authority vested in him under the
mandate, promulgated a general ordinance regulating immigration. It
was provided therein that any British government ship might board any
vessel to detain and examine persons reasonably believed to be seeking
to enter the country in violation of this regulation. It was further provided that the master of a vessel attempting to bring such persons into
the country would be guilty of the criminal offense of abetting illegal
immigration and that the ship used for such purpose would be forfeited.
Ifno criminal proceedings were instituted against the master, forfeiture
might be confirmed by petition of the Attorney General to a district
court of Palestine.
In the recent case of Molvan v. Attorney General for Palestine, the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of Great Britain indicated
that forfeiture of a foreign vessel after seizure on the high seas was
justified under this statute without violation of international law.1 A
British destroyer sighted the tanker Asya sailing without a flag about
IOO miles off the coast of Palestine. As the destroyer approached, the
Asya hoisted a Turkish flag and then replaced it with a Zionist flag. The
Zionist flag was at the time not that of any recognized state. When
boarded, the Asya was found to be carrying 733 persons, none of whom
possessed travel documents of any kind. The ship itself was without
ship's papers or passenger list. Its charts indicated a course for Tel-Aviv,
Palestine. The captain of the destroyer inferred that the Asya was engaged in illegal immigration activities and escorted it to Haifa, Palestine,
there turning the passengers over to immigration authorities. Subsequently, the Attorney General applied to the district court of Haifa for
an order confirming forfeiture of the vessel. Assuming that it had jurisdiction, since the ship was within territorial waters at the time of the
petition, the court decreed forfeiture. Both the decree and this basis for
jurisdiction were affirmed on appeal by the master of the ship to the
Supreme Court of Palestine. On further appeal to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council of Great Britain, this action was upheld; the Council
concluded in addition that the original seizure was not in violation of
international law because in conformity with the accepted practice of
nations. Even if the statute did not conform to customary international
law, it was held proper, since Great Brit~in was acting according to a
policy expressed by many nations in making it the mandatary. And even
if this were insufficient to justify the statute, the master could not complain of the seizure since his ship was entitled to fly no flag and could
claim the protection of no nation.
l

81 Ll.L.L.R. 277 (1948).
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I
If it is assumed that the seizure of the vessel would have been in
violation of customary international law, but that the master was nonetheless guilty of a crime punishable under the municipal law of Palestine,
was the seizure in the Molvan case legal because Great Britain occupied
a position as mandatary rather than as sovereign of Palestine? Both
Great Britain and Turkey were members of the League of Nations at
the time of the seizure,2 and thus parties to the League Covenant, a
multilateral treaty.8 Nations may by treaty expressly consent to the
seizure by other nations of their own vessels outside territorial waters
for designated acts/ However, the provisions of the League Covenant
relating to mandates confer no authority upon the mandatary to act
outside the territory of the mandated nation. 5 That such authority was
to be inferred is particularly unlikely in the case of the Palestine mandate,
since, as an "A" mandate, it was subject only to the administrative
advice and assistance of the mandatary and was to be provisionally recognized as an independent government.6 Even if the mandatary had been
given full authority, there would be no reason to assume that Great
Britain had thus been authorized to act in a manner which would otherwise be a violation of international law. The same difficulty is encountered
in attempting to use the Covenant as a pronouncement of policy which,
by virtue of the large number of subscribing nations, might itself be
deemed to announce a rule of international law. Great Britain's position
was in no way improved, then, by the grant of authority to her as
mandatary.

II
If it is assumed that the seizure of the vessel as a Turkish vessel
would have been in violation of international law, but that the master
was nonetheless guilty of a crime punishable under the municipal law
of Palestine, was the seizure in the Molvan case legal because the ship
was not a vessel of Turkey or any other nation? Since a ship is deemed,
at least while on the high seas, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
state of its nationality, when suffering injustice at the hands of a foreign
2
Series of League of Nations Publications, General, 1946. 1, 19, 21.
8 See I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 192-197, 199-200 (1947).
4
For example, League of Nations Treaty Series No. 1033, XLII, 73 (1925), and

No. 3290, CXLII, 181 (1933).
5
Covenant of League of Nations, art. 22 [ text in I HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 103 (1940)]; see I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed.,

199-200 (1947).
6

Covenant of League of Nations, art. 22, para. 4.
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state it can claim the protection of its own nation. 7 The nationality of a
ship is shown prima facie by its flag, but can be proved against adverse
contention only by a showing of proper documentation under the laws of
the flag state. 8 Since the Asya carried no papers supporting its right to
fly the Turkish flag, it was not the ship of any state, and the rights of
no state under international law were violated by its seizure on the
high seas.
But the ship is still the property of its owner, the master, and is
protected by whatever rights he can assert in behalf of his property.9
The question, then, is solely one of the extent of his rights as an alien
under international law. Though publicists contend that the notion
of the lack of international legal personality of the individual is an
anachronism in modern legal theory,1° in practice international law has
been a law of states, and rights and duties under it have accrued only to
states.11 There would seem to be no good reason why vessels not under
the jurisdiction of some state should yet elude the jurisdiction of a state
whose laws they have offended, merely because they are on the high
seas.12

III

If it is assumed that the seizure of the vessel was in violation of
international law, but that the master was nonetheless guilty of a crime
punishable under the municipal law of Palestine, should the illegality
7
1 HAcKwoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2-5 (1940); 2 Id., 720-721,
724-725 (1941); 4 Id., 72-73 (1942); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 8th ed., 300-307
(1924); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 548-549 (1947); RrnNow,
NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL, 13-15 (1937).
8
I HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 22-24 (1940); 2 Id., 724728 (1941); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 8th ed., 215 (1924); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed., 545-548 (1947); R1ENow, NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT
VESSEL, 140-145, 149-188, 217-219 (1937); 2 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw, § 321 (1906).
9
HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 728-734 (1941); 2 MooRE,
DIGESToFlNTERNATIONALLAw, 1009 (1906).
10
JESSUP, A MoDERN LAW OF NATIONS, c. 2-4 (1948). Lauterpacht, "Subjects of
the Law of Nations," 63 L.Q. REv. 438 (1947); Aufricht, "Personality in International
Law," 37 AM. PoL. Sex. REv. 217 (1943); Brown, "The Individual and International
Law," 18 A.J.I.L. 532 (1924). In fact, public bodies other than states have been recognized as international entities, and in some instances of treaties and arbitration proceedings
individuals have been so recognized. See Lauterpacht, "Subjects of the Law of Nations,"
63 L.Q. REV. 438, 444-453 (1947); I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed.,
114-116, 579-580 (1947).
11
5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 486-487 (1943); HALL,
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 8th ed., Pt. I, C. 1 ( 1924); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw,
6th ed., 580-585 (1947).
12
For example, vessels engaging in piracy are deemed stateless, and consequently
liable to seizure on the high seas by any nation. See 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,§ 203 (1941).
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of the seizure in the Molvan case have vitiated the jurisdiction which
the courts of Palestine asserted by virtue of the presence in territorial
waters of the ship and its master at the time of the petition? Where a
criminal is properly taken under an international extradition treaty, he
may be prosecuted only for one of the offenses enumerated in the treaty,13
and, if there is no enumeration of offenses justifying extradition, only for
that particular offense for which he was extradited.14 Mere presence in
the state, obtained by extradition, does not support general jurisdiction,
and the lack of jurisdiction may be asserted by the arrested individual.
Absent some international agreement of this kind, however, the practice
of the courts has been to assume jurisdiction of persons within the territory without regard to how they came there, looking only to the validity
of local arrest. If there has been a violation of international law, the
state whose sovereignty is offended has a right to satisfaction from
the responsible state; 15 however, where the executive power of the
responsible state (as in the United States) is not supreme to the judicial
power, this right may not extend to obtaining stay of adjudication.16 But
the individual himself is without capacity to assert this violation of
international law; the matter is a political issue between the two countries
and not a justiciable issue between the individual and the country seizing
him. 17 This is true even where an extradition treaty is in existence, if
seizure is made without reference to it.18
To sustain the operation of municipal law in a manner which violates
international law is inconsistent with the theory of primacy of international law, by which all inconsistent municipal law is ultra vires.
Further, this distinction between violation of an extradition treaty and of
international law is a tenuous one. Consequently, legal writers have
contended that an individual should be able to assert this violation of
the sovereignty of his nation to defeat the jurisdiction claimed by the
nation that seized him.10 However, international law, as defined by the
18
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 641-642 (1947); 1 MooRE,
EXTRADITION, 237, 245-246 (1891).
14
4 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 306-328 (1906).
15
1 MooRE, EXTRADITION, 281-290 (1891).
16
Id., 290-293; 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 321 (1941).
17
2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 309-313, 320 (1941);
4 HACKWORTH, 224-228 (1942); 4 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 328332 (1906); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed., 262 note 2 (1947); see
JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS, 275 (1927).
18
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225 (1886); see I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 642 (1947).
19
Dickinson, "Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International
Law," 28 A.J.I.L. 231 (1934); Harvard Research on the Codification of International
Law, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 624 (1935); Ho.ffmansthall, "Ultra Vires Law," 21 AusT. L.J.
2 I 8 ( I 947). In a few states this is the law. Harvard Research on the Codification of International Law, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 624, 630 (1935).
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practic~ of the larger share of the nations, still permits the exercise of
jurisdiction obtained by illegal seizure. There was, then, no violation of
international law in the Molvan case in assumption of jurisdiction on
the basis of the defendant's presence in the territorial waters of Palestine.

IV
If it is assumed that the ship was a Turkish vessel, was there a violation
of international law in seizing it on the high seas for an act which had
not yet had any effect within Palestine or its territorial waters? If seizure
is found to be proper as to criminal acts generally, it still remains to be
shown that the state may impose criminal punishment for an act that
never had an effect in the state.
International law embodies the practices to which a major portion of
the nations commonly consent.20 Authorization by municipal legislation
of a particular practice in international affairs amounts to a declaration
by that nation of its consent to that practice. Widespread enactment of
similar statutes and acquiescence in their application indicates that the
practice has become a custom of nations.21 In so far as international law
is a source looked to for rules to be applied to individual persons by the
municipal courts,22 extensive municipal adjudication of international
questions reaching the same result also indicates common consent to that
result. 28 The existence of numerous treaties embodying similar provisions
as to an international practice may also serve to indicate common consent
to that practice.24 The results of international arbitration stand as evidence that such consent has been given.25 Whether seizure on the high
seas for a criminal act is permitted by international law depends, then,
on whether such seizure is commonly consented to by the nations. Since
the question is one of maritime significance, the practices of maritime
nations are of primary importance, and most significant are those of
the two largest: Great Britain and the United States.
From the time of the Roman Empire, when the sea was said to be
20
I HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2-5, 15-17 (1940); HALL,
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 8th ed., 1-5 (1924); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw,
6th ed., 16-19; Scott, "The Legal Nature of International Law," I A.J.I.L. 831 (1907).
21
I MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2-4 (1906).
22
1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 24-35 (1940); 1 MooRE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 9-II (1906); Dickinson, "Changing Concepts and
the Doctrine of Incorporation," 26 A.J.I.L. 239, 256-260 (1932).
355 (1936).
23
I HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 22-24 (1940); I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed., 29-31 (1947).
24
I HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 17-21 (1940); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8th ed., 7-12 (1924); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed.,
26-27 (1947).
25
II OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed., 31-32 (1947).
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absolutely free, until the present, when a somewhat similar characteristic
can be said to exist, there have been various attempts to reduce the sea
to sovereign claims. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have, however, seen a general recognition that the high seas cannot be made a
part of the territory of any state.26 But even the decline of assertions of
sovereignty did not remove the antithesis between a completely free
sea and an adequately defended land. This conflict was resolved in the
seventeenth century by Grotius, who proposed that the state should
exercise some sovereignty over as much of the sea as could be controlled
from the land. This theory was rendered more tangible by Bynkershoek,
who described this area of control as that within the range of coast defense
batteries. Largely through the efforts of Thomas Je:fferson in the United
States at the end of the eighteenth century, this area became the three
mile limit, the approximate cannon range at that time. 27 The divorce of
the limit from the theory of its origin prevented the area of control
from expanding with the extension of gun range, and it has remained the
limit of territorial waters recognized by the United States, Great Britain, and many other countries ever since.28 All the area outside this
marginal belt is that known as the high seas.29 Since the United States
and Great Britain have been the most ardent advocates of the three
mile limit as a maximum of territorial control, extensions of the limit
onto the high seas for any purpose by those countries is of particular
significance in defining an international law recognizing some jurisdiction on the high seas.
Since before r700, British legislation has authorized the seizure of
vessels hovering off British coasts if the vessels were found to be engaged
26

For history of the concept of freedom of the seas, see 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 198 (1941); 2 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw,
886-914 (1906); FULTON, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA, 1-22 (1911); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 8th ed., 78-190 (1924); HIGGINS & CoLOMBos, INTERNATIONAL LAw
OF THE SEA, 37-54 (1945); I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 533-538
(1947); Fenn, "Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea," 19 A.J.I.L. 716 (1925).
27
For history of territorial waters, see 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, § 198 (1941); I MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 698-700, 702-706(1906); FULTON, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA, Pt. II, C. 1 (1911); HIGGINS & CoLoMBos,.
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, 62-67, (1945); JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL
WATERS, 7-9 (1927).
28
1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 630-631 (1940); 1 MooRE,.
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 706-724 (1906); FULTON, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
SEA, 650-668 (1911); HIGGINS & CoLoMBos, INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA; C. 3
(1945); JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS, 9-71 (1927); Dickinson, "Jurisdiction
at the Maritime Frontier," 40 HARv. L. REv. I ( I 926).
29
2 HACKWORTH, D1GEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 651 (1941); HIGGINS &
CoLOMBos, INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA, 37 (1945); JESSUP, LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERS, 61, 388 (1927); I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed.,
538-539 (1947).
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in smuggling activities. The smuggling problem was exactly that of the
Molvan case, though here the attempt was to smuggle people in violation
of immigration laws rather than liquor in violation of revenue laws.
These hovering statutes gave authority for seizure as far as I oo leagues
from shore, the limit of the statute varying from time to time with the
changing need for extended control. This fluctuation of extent with need
indicates that the policy behind the statutes was to authorize that control
reasonably necessary to meet the particular problem.80 Apparently all
nations acquiesced in this exercise of authority on the high seas. 81 It is
true that in I 876 British law was made applicable only to ships partly
owned by British subjects or part of the passengers of which· were
British,82 but, in accord with the policy of the statutes, this corresponded
to a decreased need for authority to seize wholly foreign vessels. As to
the ships whose seizure it did authorize, this statute set no definite limit.
In addition, aside from the fact that the statute still includes ships which
are foreign within the meaning of international law, subsequent legislation 83 has made it clear that Great Britain has not abandoned the special
jurisdiction she formerly exercised on the high seas.34 This is substantiated by the result in the Molvan case.
Similar legislation has been in e~stence in the United States sine~
1790. Hovering vessels found to be carrying persons to be sold as slaves
may be seized at any distance from the coast.85 Search and seizure of
hovering smuggling vessels, once permitted anywhere on the high seas,
is now generally limited to twelve miles, though under some circumstances it may extend as far as sixty-two miles from the coast.86 Again
the policy determining the extent of authority seems to have been the
distance reasonably necessary to effectuate the statute.87 Other countries
have acquiesced in the exercise of this authority. Diplomatic complaints
Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the Treasury Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE
CoMMl'ITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 104-106 (1935).
s1 Id., 9482 39 and 40 Viet., c. 36.
38
The preamble to 41 and 42 Viet., c. 73 ( I 878), states that "the rightful jurisdiction of Her Majesty ••• extends ••• over the open seas adjacent to the coasts of the United
Kingdom ••• to such a distance as is necessary for the defence and security •••"
84 For history of British legislation, see Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the Treasury
Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE CoMMl'ITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 5496,
74th Cong., 1st sess., 86-89, 100 (1935); I MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
714-715, 725-732 (1906); JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS, 77-79 (1927);
MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS, Pt. I (1929).
85
35 Stat. L. u39, u40, §§ 251, 258 (1909); 18 U.S.C. (1946) § 426, 46
(1946) § 1355.
86
49 Stat. L. 517 § I (1935), 19 U.S.C. (1946) § 1701; see 31 A.J.l.L. IOI
(1937).
87
Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the Treasury Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE
CoMMl'ITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 103-104, 106109 (1935); see JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS,_ 80-86 (1927).
80

u.s.c.
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appear to have been registered only by Great Britain and France.38 No
complaint was pressed, and the treaties eventually resulting with these
nations recognized a contiguous zone within which rights contended
for by the United States were properly exercisable. 39
That other nations have been even more prone to recognize some
jurisdiction outside the three mile zone is evidenced by municipal legislation authorizing seizure there to prevent violation of revenue and
sanitary laws. 4 ° Further, attempts of the League of Nations to define
and codify international law revealed widespread rejection of the three
mile limit as an absolute maximum, because of its inadequacy and inconsistency with existing practice. Especially significant was the demand for
a contiguous zone outside territorial waters in which jurisdiction might
be exercised for special purposes.41
Because of a decreased need for this authority, there has been an absence of adjudication under the British statutes in recent years. However,
earlier judicial decisions under those statutes sustained their operation
to the extent reasonably necessary. 42 The courts of the United States
have reached the same result in applying statutes of the United States.43
No international arbitration has expressly decided the question, but it
appears that none has denied the existence of such jurisdiction.44
Treaties embodying the right to seize hovering smuggling vessels as
far as one hour's sailing distance from shore have been entered by the
United States with sixteen other nations including France and Great
Britain.45 Since European nations among themselves have also entered
such treaties, twenty-four nations have become parties to treaties recognizing a right to seize hovering vessels outside territorial waters. 46
38
Masterson seems to have discovered no others; see MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN
MARGINAL SEAs, 304-325 (1929).
39
For a history of United States legislation, see Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the
Treasury Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE CoMMITTEE oN WAYS AND MEANS ON
H.R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 89-94, 95-98 (1935); MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN
MARGINAL SEAS, Pt. III (1929); l HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
664-690 (1940); 1 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 725-732 (1906).
40
l HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 663-664 (1940); JESSUP,
LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS, 86-92 (1927); Masterson, "National Jurisdiction in the
Marginal Seas over Foreign Smuggling Vessels," 13 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS
SocIETY, 53, 65-74 (1928).
41
l HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 624, 628-630 (1940);
MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS, 385-400 (1929).
42
Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the Treasury Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 100 (1935).
43
Id., 100-104; JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS, 241-276 (1927).
44
Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the Treasury Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE
CoMMITTEEoNWAYSAND MEANS ON H.R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1stsess., 109 (1935).
45
Id., 98-99; JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS, 279-317 (1927).
46
Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the Treasury Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE
COMMITTEE oNWAYSAND MEANS ON H.R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 99 (1935).
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From the foregoing, text writers agree that there is a strip of coastal
water over which the littoral state has full control.47 In addition, all
concede that in practice nations do act on the high seas to the extent
necessary to cope with threatened violations of municipal laws.48 The
writers disagree, however, as to the basis for this extension of control.
Most British writers conclude that there is no basis in international law
for permitting municipal law to operate extraterritorially on the high
seas, and that where it is done it is acquiesced in as a matter of comity.49
On the other hand,. substantial authority among British writers and
almost all American writers concludes that it is now a positive rule of
international law that a nation can go outside its territorial waters to
the extent reasonably necessary to prevent violation at least of its revenue
and sanitation laws.50 Since the common consent of nations is that which
determines international law, the American writers are on sound ground
when they point out that that which has been done as a matter of comity
since the end of the eighteenth century must by this time have become a
rule of law. 51
Accepting the existence of a rule of international law permitting a
nation to go as far out of its territorial waters as is reasonable under the
circumstances to prevent violations of revenue or sanitation laws, can
the statute in the Molvan case be brought within this rule? It would
seem that the regulation of immigration is sufficiently like the protection
of revenue to make applicable in both cases the policy that permits
statutes protecting revenue to be enforced on the high seas.112 The only
problem then is whether seizure IOO miles at sea is reasonable. The
statute in the Molvan case, if interpreted to authorize seizure outside
territorial waters at all, imposes no limit on the distance within which
seizure can be made; the question is one for the court to determine upon
the facts of each case. Since the Asya was clearly on its way to Palestine
with the objective of violating the law of that mandate, it cannot be
said that the court erred in finding the seizure reasonable.
There remains the problem whether the master's act on the high
seas can properly be called a crime under the law of Palestine. Ordinarily, crime is said to be territorial, and only acts committed within
47 I
48

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed., 442-449 (1947).
2 PIGGOTT, NATIONALITY, 47-51 (1907).
49 Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the Treasury Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE
COMMITTEE oN WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1st sess., I 11-115 (1935).
50
Id., II5-II9; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed.,§ 19o(i) (1947),
but see§ 19o(ii).
51
Dr. H. E. Yntema's Brief for the Treasury Department, H. HEARINGS BEFORE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 5496, 7 4th Cong., 1st sess., I I 9-122 ( I 93 5).
52
Masterson, "National Jurisdiction in the Marginal Seas over Foreign Smuggling
Vessels," 13 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GRonus SocIETY, 53, 63-68 (1928); see 2 PIGGOTT,
NATIONALITY, 51-52 (1907).
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the territory are crimes.58 However, a crime is deemed committed in the
territory, though the act occurs outside, if it takes effect within the
territory/¼ Whether the practice is sufficiently widespread to be justified
as international law, nations have frequently declared an act a crime at a
point before it has had any local effect if it ultimately would have had
such an effect.55 Exemplary are the hovering statutes referred to previously. If this is so at all, it would seem at least to be proper to declare
such an act a crime when it occurs within that portion of the high seas in
which a state can seize for crimes in general without violating international law. Since it has already been suggested that the seizure in the
Molvan case was proper, it can then be said that the act of abetting illegal
immigration was also properly called a crime against the law of Palestine.

David D. Ring, S.Ed.

58 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, §135 (1941); 2 MOORE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 243-255 (1906); 26 MicH. L. REv. 429 (1928).
H 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 136 (1941); 2 MooRE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 243, 258-269 (1906); Harvard Research on the
Codification of International Law, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 480-506 (1935).
55 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 137, (1941); Harvard Research on the Codification of International Law, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 506-508, 543-561
(1935); see Beckett, "The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners," 1925
Br. Y.B.I.L. 44.
.

